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INTRODUCTION 
In the award-winning documentary The Corporation, public intel-
lectuals and activists characterize corporations as “externalizing ma-
chines,” “doom machines,” “persons with no moral conscience,” and 
“monsters trying to devour as much profit as possible at anyone’s ex-
pense.”1 In other footage, people on the street personify corporations: 
                                                 
* Department of Anthropology, Cornell University. I am grateful to numerous people for providing 
generative feedback on earlier drafts of this article, including Vivian Choi, Ingrid Diran, María 
Fernández, Bishnupriya Ghosh, Durba Ghosh, TJ Hinrichs, Hiro Miyazaki, Paul Nadasdy, Rachel 
Prentice, Sara Pritchard, Dinah Rajak, Adam T. Smith, and Wendy Wolford, as well as to the organ-
izers and audiences of workshops and colloquia at the Yale University School of Forestry and Envi-
ronmental Studies, with special thanks to Karen Hébert and Nina Dewi Horstmann; the Department 
of Anthropology, University of Texas, San Antonio, with special thanks to Joanna Lambert; 
Laboratoire d’Anthropologies des Mondes Contemporains, Université Libre de Bruxelles, with 
special thanks to Mathieu Hilgers; the Society for the Humanities, Cornell University; and last but 
not least to participants at two very stimulating Berle Symposia hosted by the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. 
Center on Corporations, Law & Society, at Seattle University School of Law, with special thanks to 
Charles O’Kelley. 
 1. THE CORPORATION (Zeitgeist Films 2003). Some scholars insist on distinguishing between 
the corporation as a legal entity “entitled to operate in the legal system and in particular to own 
assets, to enter into contracts and to incur liabilities,” and the firm as “the economic activity devel-
oped as a consequence of the cluster of contracts connecting the corporation owning these assets to 
various holders of resources required in the firm’s operations.” Jean-Philippe Robé, The Legal Struc-
ture of the Firm, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. Article 5 (2011). For the purposes of this Article, I use the 
term corporation as it appears in popular discourse, which collapses this distinction. In popular dis-
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“General Electric: a kind old man with lots of stories;” “Nike: young, 
energetic;” “Microsoft: aggressive;” “McDonald’s: young, outgoing, en-
thusiastic;” “Monsanto: immaculately dressed;” “Disney: goofy;” “The 
Body Shop: deceptive.”2 
The documentary, like screenwriter and legal scholar Joel Bakan’s 
book The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power, 
imparts dissonant messages about corporations. On the one hand, the 
film challenges the appropriateness of extending legal personhood to 
them.3 On the other hand, it perpetuates and reinforces the popular trope 
of personhood by framing corporations as actors with the capacity—and 
legal obligation—to formulate and act upon an intention: maximizing 
profits for shareholders.4 Evaluating corporations according to standard 
criteria derived from individual clinical psychology,5 the film finds that 
the dominant institution of our time is a psychopath. And not just your 
run-of-the-mill human psychopath. Corporations are jacked up with su-
perpowers: omniscience, immortality, unlimited size, and mobility.6 The 
film serves up the orthodox corporation as a figure of unbearable terror 
and infinite irresponsibility. 
This Article argues that Bakan and his film collaborators implicitly 
draw on a liberal model of personhood to depict the corporation as Homo 
economicus, the ideal culprit in a forensic context. After examining the 
social appeal and problematic legal foundations of this account, I turn to 
how social studies of the state and anthropological theories of person-
hood may extend social analysis of corporations in other directions, if 
corporations are understood as open and unstable phenomena. I then 
draw on my research on mining in Indonesia to explore the issue of vio-
lence and human rights abuses carried out by state forces in extractive 
industry zones, using this material to explore the limits of the model of 
the corporation as a free-standing, self-constituting subject in forensic 
contexts. 
                                                                                                             
course, anxieties are more frequently expressed around corporations, corporate control, and corpo-
rate power rather than around “the firm,” “business enterprises,” or “business entities.” 
 2. THE CORPORATION, supra note 1. 
 3. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 
(2004). 
 4. Id. 
 5 . The criteria are drawn from AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV (4th ed. 1994). 
 6. See TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE DISABLING 
OF DEMOCRACY (2005). 
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I. THE CORPORATION AS HOMO ECONOMICUS 
The mistake that people make, they think [corporations are] people 
like us. They think they have feelings, politics, belief systems. They 
really don’t, they only have one thing: the bottom line. How to 
make as much money as they can in any given quarter. That’s it. 
      – Michael Moore7 
 
These are special kind of persons which are designed by law to be 
concerned only for their stockholders. . . . So they’re concerned on-
ly for the short-term profit of their stockholders, who are very high-
ly concentrated. 
      –Noam Chomsky8 
 
All publicly traded corporations have been structured, through a se-
ries of legal decisions, to have a peculiar and disturbing characteris-
tic. They are required, by law, to place the financial interests of their 
owners above competing interests. In fact, the corporation is legally 
bound to put its bottom line ahead of everything else, even the pub-
lic good. 
     – Narrator, The Corporation9 
 
The Corporation universalizes and homogenizes corporations, bun-
dling together disparate examples of corporate misbehavior to declare 
“the corporation” a psychopath (by this logic, “the human,” too, is a psy-
chopath).10 Despite significant roots in Canada, the film focuses on U.S. 
corporate history, and deemphasizes national idiosyncrasies.11 Two con-
ventional U.S. touchstones furnish evidence that corporations are obli-
gated to relentlessly maximize profits: the case Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Company and the conservative Chicago school of economics thinker 
Milton Friedman, who is duly trotted out to restate his 1970 doctrine that 
“the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”12 
In Dodge, the Dodge brothers, as Ford stockholders, sued the com-
pany over Henry Ford’s plan to curtail shareholder dividends in order to 
                                                 
 7. THE CORPORATION, supra note 1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. E.g., William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663 (1974) (discussing how the United States is unusual in that incorporation occurs at the state 
rather than at the federal level, prompting states to develop business-friendly laws in a competitive 
“race to the bottom”). 
 12. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Milton Friedman, The Social Re-
sponsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970. 
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invest company profits in expanding plants with the express social pur-
pose of providing more employment to workers and more affordable cars 
to consumers.13 The Michigan Supreme Court allowed the company to 
proceed with the planned expansion, and even allowed that directors re-
tain “implied powers to carry on with humanitarian motives such chari-
table works as are incidental to the main business of the corporation,”14 
but ordered it to use remaining cash resources to pay dividends to share-
holders.15 While Bakan cites Dodge v. Ford as the go-to case supporting 
the “legal principle that managers and directors have a legal duty to put 
shareholders’ interests above all others and no legal authority to serve 
any other interests,”16 many dispute this perspective, perhaps none so 
vigorously as legal scholar Lynn Stout. Stout argues for eliminating the 
case from the canon of corporate law, noting that it is flawed and dated, 
derives from a court with limited influence in corporate law, and is large-
ly treated as irrelevant in corporate law and practice, as well as by courts 
and legislatures.17 Corporate law casebooks regularly reproduce Dodge 
and return to an “offhand remark” made by the court to the effect that a 
business corporation exists “primarily for the profit of the stockholders,” 
with “the powers of the directors . . . to be employed for that end.”18 This 
statement, Stout argues, “lacks any foundation in corporate law,” which 
generally defines corporate purpose as “anything ‘lawful,’” rather than as 
profiting shareholders.19 The American Law Institute’s official statement 
on the purpose of business corporations embraces competing values, and 
notes that those companies whose primary objective is profit are still 
obliged to act within the boundaries of the law and to take into account 
ethical considerations. 20  Corporate law tends to defer to managerial 
                                                 
 13. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671. 
 14. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 
168 (2008). 
 15. Ian B. Lee, Is There a Cure for Corporate “Psychopathy”?, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 65, 72 
(2005). 
 16. BAKAN, supra note 3, at 36. 
 17. Stout, supra note 14, at 163–76. The statement was also irrelevant to the court’s decision, 
which hinged on Ford using his status as a majority shareholder (not as a corporate director) to op-
press minority investors. Id. at 167. Stout characterizes the dicta itself as “mealy-mouthed,” and 
notes that it treats profit-seeking as the “primary” but not exclusive corporate goal. Id. at 168. Stout 
attributes the enduring popularity of Dodge v. Ford in the case law canon to law professors’ desire to 
provide law students with a simple answer when they innocently ask, “What do corporations do?” Id. 
at 175. Like parents who turn to stories of cabbages and storks when their children ask them where 
babies come from, law professors “are tempted to default to Dodge v. Ford and its charming and 
easily understood fable of shareholder wealth maximization.” Id. 
18. Id. at 165.  
 19. Id. at 172. 
 20. See ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM xii (1st ed. 2013). 
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judgment rather than second-guess it in hindsight,21 and acts of corporate 
social responsibility themselves can almost always be given a profit-
oriented rationalization. 22  Courts generally shield corporate directors 
from any legal obligation to maximize shareholder wealth, and have in 
various cases upheld stakeholder interests over shareholder profits.23 If 
directors and executives do not have an enforceable legal duty to maxim-
ize shareholder wealth, Stout notes, today they are nevertheless “far more 
likely to perceive themselves to have such a duty.”24 
This perception is due in large part to the extraordinary success of 
the shareholder value movement that blossomed in the turbulent 1980s, 
when 29% of Fortune 500 companies were subject to hostile takeover 
attempts.25 The movement drew its intellectual justification from adher-
ents of the “agency theory” or “law and economics” school of thought, 
which depicts corporations as nothing more than a “nexus of contracts” 
between individuals.26 This line of analysis typically frames shareholders 
as purely profit-oriented “owners” of corporations, and managers as 
agents whose interests must be aligned with those of their shareholder 
principals through devices such as stock options. Various scholars have 
criticized the legal misconceptions and anemic view of humanity on 
which the shareholder value movement rests. They point to its promotion 
of social and economic inequality and environmental destruction, and its 
production of dysfunctionalities such as a short-term focus that can lead 
it to fail (sometimes spectacularly) on its own terms.27 
                                                 
 21. Lee, supra note 15, at 72. 
 22. MARINA WELKER, ENACTING THE CORPORATION: AN AMERICAN MINING FIRM IN POST-
AUTHORITARIAN INDONESIA 14, 26–27 (2014). 
 23. See, e.g., GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED 
AMERICA (2009); LYNN SHARP PAINE, VALUE SHIFT: WHY COMPANIES MUST MERGE SOCIAL AND 
FINANCIAL IMPERATIVES TO ACHIEVE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (2003); LYNN A. STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 29 (2012); Stout, supra note 14. 
 24. STOUT, supra note 23, at 53. 
 25. Gerald F. Davis & Tracy A. Thompson, A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate 
Control, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 141, 158 (1994). 
 26. For classic statements of agency theory, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 
(1980). For critiques of the hegemonic hold of such views in business schools, see RAKESH 
KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION (2007); 
William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL 
L. REV. 407 (1989) (discussing law schools); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the 
Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753 (2006). 
 27. See, e.g., KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET (2009); STOUT, 
supra note 23; William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideol-
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Rather than questioning the shareholder-centered orthodoxy preva-
lent in finance,28 Bakan lends credence to its more extreme practices and 
justifications. Bakan argues that the “corporation’s legally defined man-
date is to pursue, relentlessly and without exception, its own self-interest, 
regardless of the often harmful consequences it might cause to others.”29 
Bakan then takes Milton Friedman one step further. Whereas Friedman 
acknowledges that companies must operate within the bounds of both 
law and ethical custom,30 Bakan claims that “the corporation’s mandate 
to pursue its own self-interest, itself a product of the law, actually propels 
corporations to break the law.”31 The conclusions Bakan draws from the 
supposed legal requirement that corporations maximize shareholder prof-
its have the effect of naturalizing the worst corporate behavior. The cor-
poration is, in this view, legally determined to behave in a way that flouts 
the law whenever potential profits outweigh penalties. 
Although Bakan’s claim that corporations are legally obliged to 
maximize profits for shareholders lacks legal foundations, it nevertheless 
stands as a significant folk theory of corporate legal purpose. This folk 
theory not only circulates in executive suites and investment banks as 
part of the ideological complex of shareholder value,32 but also appears 
in casual conversations and academic analyses,33 wherein it allows critics 
to construct corporations as ideal culpable subjects endowed with will, 
purpose, desire, and a capacity for action.34 
                                                                                                             
ogy for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000); Marina Welker & David Wood, 
Shareholder Activism and Alienation, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S57 (2011). 
 28. Ira Bashkow, Afterword: What Kind of a Person Is the Corporation?, 37 POLAR: POL. & 
LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 296, 304 (2014). 
 29. BAKAN, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
 30. Friedman, supra note 12. 
 31. BAKAN, supra note 3, at 80. 
 32. See HO, supra note 27. 
 33. See PETER BENSON, TOBACCO CAPITALISM: GROWERS, MIGRANT WORKERS, AND THE 
CHANGING FACE OF A GLOBAL INDUSTRY 57 (2011) (stating that a corporation has a “fiduciary duty” 
to “constantly maximize profits” for shareholders); KIM FORTUN, ADVOCACY AFTER BHOPAL: 
ENVIRONMENTALISM, DISASTER, NEW GLOBAL ORDERS 104 (2001) (“[T]he overarching responsi-
bility of a corporation is singular—maximization of shareholder wealth.”); KILLER COMMODITIES: 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE CORPORATE PRODUCTION OF HARM 196 (Merrill Singer & Hans Baer eds., 
2009) (stating corporations’ “duties . . . up and down the supply chain [are] to maximize profits for 
shareholders”). 
 34. This tendency to unify actors and attribute will to them in forensic contexts is also apparent 
in literature on the state. See AKHIL GUPTA, RED TAPE: BUREAUCRACY, STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE, 
AND POVERTY IN INDIA 55 (2012) (arguing that commitment to disaggregating the state allows for 
occasions where “branches and levels of the state may act cohesively,” adding that “one would be 
justified in saying that the state acted to perpetrate violence on a group of people, as in the pogroms 
against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 and the riots of 1984 against Sikhs in Delhi”). 
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Critics may be troubled by corporations accessing rights through 
legal personhood, but they exploit the trope for their own purposes.35 As 
John Locke argued, “person” is a forensic term, useful for assigning 
blame.36 In conventional Euro-American thought, according to political 
theorist Iris Marion Young, culpable subjects are ideally intentional sub-
jects.37 In our blaming practices, “we tend to see those blamed as guilty 
of willful harm.”38 Experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe has shown 
that when people are confronted with a hypothetical case in which busi-
ness activities have produced side effects that are either beneficial or 
harmful to the environment, they are more likely to classify benefits as 
unintentional and harms as intentional.39 
Discussing later work with cognitive neuroscientists, Knobe de-
scribes his team’s finding that people apply their “theory of mind” to 
corporations as “disturbing” and “worrisome.”40 In doing so, people lose 
sight of corporations’ complex structures and attribute to them thoughts, 
goals, and intentions. Corporations, he implies, cannot possibly possess 
these qualities.41 But assessments of corporate criminal liability in certain 
legal settings rest on the (nonuniversal) assumption “that business enti-
ties are ‘moral actors’ with identifiable intentions and purposes, which 
may therefore ‘deserve’ criminal punishment.”42 Legally recognizing the 
firm as an “entity” or “person” is foundational to the application of crim-
inal law in such cases.43 
Like much critical scholarship and activism, The Corporation wa-
vers on the question of whether its subject exists as an independent entity 
capable of formulating thoughts and intentions.44 One of its interviewees, 
                                                 
 35. See generally Suzana Sawyer, Disabling Corporate Sovereignty in a Transnational Lawsuit, 
29 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 23 (2006). Sawyer argues that an understanding of 
ChevronTexaco as a “natural person” serves contradictory agendas, helping corporate management 
and legal counsel in sidestepping responsibility for environmental harms in Ecuador, but also help-
ing plaintiffs demanding corporate accountability. 
 36. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 278 (Adamant Media 
Corp. 2001) (1689). 
 37. Iris Marion Young, Katrina: Too Much Blame, Not Enough Responsibility, DISSENT, Win-
ter 2006, at 41, 42. 
 38. Id. 
 39 . Joshua Knobe, Theory of Mind and Moral Cognition: Exploring the Connections, 9 
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 357, 358 (2008). 
 40. See Joshua Knobe, Op-Ed., Do Corporations Have Minds?, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2015), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/do-corporations-have-minds/?_r=0  
 41. Id. 
 42. ORTS, supra note 20, at 134. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Philip Abrams, Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State, 1 J. HIST. SOC. 58 (1988). 
Abrams pointed to a related tension in Marxist scholarship on the state: for purposes of theory the 
state was known to be unreal, but for purposes of practice it is treated as real. He attributed this 
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philosopher and activist Vandana Shiva, flatly proclaims, “The corpora-
tion is not a person. It doesn’t think.”45 Shiva goes on to accuse the de-
velopers of Monsanto’s seed terminator technology, or so-called suicide 
gene, of possessing brutal minds.46 And yet, locating agency and respon-
sibility solely in the beliefs and practices of human individuals does not 
seem to get it quite right either. Chomsky insists that “every one of us 
under some circumstances could be a gas chamber attendant and a saint,” 
arguing that it is in particular institutional roles that people become 
“monsters because the institution is monstrous.”47 
The Corporation contains footage of free marketeers, executives, 
and consultants discussing deeply disturbing ideas and practices, but the 
filmmakers also underscore the humanity and basic niceness of many 
executives by focusing on repentant, reformed, and enlightened capital-
ists and their epiphanal moments (e.g., Roy Anderson and Robert 
Monks).48 In one particular scene, Sir Mark Moody-Stuart, then-CEO of 
Shell, and his wife incongruously serve tea and coffee to a group of Earth 
First! activists on their front lawn.49 An activist banner proclaiming the 
denizens of the Moody-Stuart residence as “MURDERERS” hangs over 
the roof of the house, while in the foreground the CEO’s wife apologizes 
for not having any soymilk for the vegan activists.50 In their initial inter-
action, one activist deliberately averts his gaze from the CEO’s wife; the 
mutual human recognition implied by ordinary dialogue perhaps seems 
too incompatible with the unilateral accusation implied by the banner: 
Mrs. Moody-Stuart: Who are you? 
John (Earth First! Activist): My name’s John. 
Mrs. Moody-Stuart: You’re not looking at me when you say it. You 
have to be a little bit careful because I’m very sensitive to people 
                                                                                                             
dissonance to the fact that an abstract-formal entity has little appeal as an object of political struggle. 
Abrams wrote: 
The seriousness and comprehensiveness of the struggle to conquer political power call for 
a serious view of the autonomous reality of political power. Paradoxically, they call for a 
suspension of disbelief about the concrete existence of the state. In effect to opt for politi-
cal struggle thus becomes a matter of participating in the ideological construction of the 
state as a real entity. 
Id. at 70. Whereas the state is amenable to being seen as pursuing various goals (from serving capital 
or elite interests to a more progressive set of functions), we have a ready-made, one-size-fits-all 
account of what the business corporation is all about—it is bent on maximizing profits. 
 45.  THE CORPORATION, supra note 1. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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who are not friendly. [To husband] Did you know that we are being 
recorded and filmed? 
Sir Mark Moody-Stuart: No. 
Activist: Well, you’ll see yourself on television then. 
Mrs. Moody-Stuart: I think it would have been polite to have men-
tioned it. I mean, here we are . . . 
John: Politeness? This man is involved in a corporation which is 
funding directly police, which this corporation has admitted . . . 
Mrs. Moody-Stuart: Who is the corporation? 
John: A corporation is an organization of individuals, and this indi-
vidual [Mark Moody-Stuart] is part of that corporation so he’s re-
sponsible.51 
John’s description of the corporation as an “organization of indi-
viduals” illustrates the struggle to define the agents responsible for cor-
porate-related violence including, in this case, the execution of Ogoni 
environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian government.52 If 
it is a “sleight of hand” to assume that a corporation is merely “com-
posed of (or acted for) by a set of individuals” and thereby “‘consists of’ 
those individuals,”53 the common alternative view of the corporation as a 
macro-actor modeled on the intentional and autonomous liberal subject is 
also difficult to square with corporate complexity. Both of these under-
standings of the corporation show the difficulty of construing actors and 
agency in nonhuman terms. The view of the corporation as an intentional 
macro-actor can serve pragmatic ends. In forensic contexts, it supports 
critical analysis and, in legal systems where criminal intent can be im-
puted to corporations, creates a potential path to justice, retribution, and 
deterrence.54 At the same time, this view provides a very limited account 
of the broader set of relations that may give rise to violence and harm, as 
                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Michael Watts, Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria, 9 GEOPOLITICS 50 (2010). 
 53. Bashkow, supra note 28, at 305. 
 54. ORTS, supra note 20, at 51. Orts notes that, in practice, the legal standard of culpability 
often applied is strict liability (“no-fault liability requiring proof only of a causal connection without 
a culpability or state of mind requirement, which is only very rarely the standard for criminal liabil-
ity and sometimes used for tort liability”), rather than intentional harm, recklessness, or negligence. 
Id. at 134. He attributes this to “the complexity of modern business organization and the difficulty of 
tracing some kinds of harm to a clearly wrongful cause or act by a specific legal person (either an 
individual or an entity).” Id. at 135. 
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I explore in my discussion of the Indonesian mining context below. But 
first I turn to insights from social studies of the state and personhood. 
II. BEYOND THE LIBERAL SUBJECT 
Like the fiction of humans as rational, sovereign, self-constituting, 
self-maximizing liberal individuals, the conceit of the profit-maximizing 
corporation as “just a scaled-up version of Economic Man” appears brit-
tle in the face of the complexity and contradictions that make up actual 
organizational life.55 To take better account of the “multiplicity of social 
relations constitutive of the corporation,”56 I turn to (1) social studies of 
“the state,” understood as a set of material relations and processes rather 
than a metaphysical entity; and (2) anthropological theories of person-
hood that emphasize relationality, interdependence, and context. These 
theories construe persons as mutable, partible, composite, and permeable. 
My approach to the corporation draws inspiration from scholarship 
on the state, as evidenced in my title alluding to Philip Abrams’s influen-
tial article.57 By historicizing, localizing, and disaggregating state prac-
tices, historians, sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, and political 
theorists have called into question the integrity of the state as a coherent, 
unified, bounded, and autonomous agent.58 In this work, the challenge is 
                                                 
 55. Bashkow, supra note 28, at 304. For a discussion of corporate complexity, internal divi-
sions, and jurisdictional disputes, as well as of passionate and irrational behavior and Oedipal dra-
mas displayed in cubicles, corner offices, and factory floors, see STEVE COLL, PRIVATE EMPIRE: 
EXXONMOBIL AND AMERICAN POWER (2012); ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF 
CORPORATE MANGERS (1988); GIDEON KUNDA, ENGINEERING CULTURE: CONTROL AND 
COMMITMENT IN A HIGH-TECH CORPORATION (rev. ed. 2006); ERICA SCHOENBERGER, THE 
CULTURAL CRISIS OF THE FIRM (1997); WELKER, supra note 22; Phillip O’Neill & J. K. Gibson-
Graham, Enterprise Discourse and Executive Talk: Stories That Destabilize the Company, 24 
TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 11 (1999); Erica Schoenberger, Interdisciplinarity and 
Social Power, 25 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 365 (1997); Nigel Thrift & Kris Olds, Refiguring the 
Economic in Economic Geography, 20 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 311 (1996). A range of social 
theorists have argued that the liberal person and Homo economicus are historically significant ideo-
logies rather than analytic models offering useful insight into actual human behavior. E.g., MARY 
DOUGLAS & STEVEN NEY, MISSING PERSONS: A CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1998); 
MAURICE GODELIER, THE ENIGMA OF THE GIFT (Nora Scott trans., 1999); BRONISLAW KASPER 
MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC: AN ACCOUNT OF NATIVE ENTERPRISE AND 
ADVENTURE IN THE ARCHIPELAGOES OF MELANESIAN NEW GUINEA (E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950) 
(1922); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC 
SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., Routledge Classics 1990) (1950); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2d ed. 1991); 
MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS (1972). 
 56. FORTUN, supra note 33. 
 57. See Abrams, supra note 44. 
 58. For a range of works on the state that develop a historical and disaggregated perspective, 
see ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE MARGINS OF THE STATE (Veena Das & Deborah Poole eds., 2004); 
PHILIP CORRIGAN & DEREK SAYER, THE GREAT ARCH: ENGLISH STATE FORMATION AS CULTURAL 
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not simply to take such entities apart, but to understand how ordinary 
actors put them together in everyday life and enact them as collective 
subjects that exist and bear interests, rights, and obligations.59 
Analytic philosophers have argued for the existence of corporate 
agents, variously called joint, collective, or plural subjects, through the 
pooling of will and intention towards single goals.60 This work often uses 
hypothetical examples and imaginary conversations between disembod-
ied human subjects. In organization theory, some have similarly argued 
that organizations merit the ontological status of actors because they pos-
sess intentionality, responsibility, sovereignty, goals, values, 
self-reflexivity, and self-identity.61  In such renderings the corporation 
appears to be “intangibly strong”;62 it has no corpus, no body. But, as 
Mitchell argues, we derive the seemingly metaphysical effect of the state 
as actor, along with abstract traits such as sovereignty, from material re-
lations and practices such as “[s]etting up and policing a frontier [which] 
involves a variety of fairly modern social practices—continuous barbed-
wire fencing, passports, immigration laws, inspections, currency control, 
and so on.”63 Scholars conducting social studies of the corporation can 
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 62. MOL, supra note 59, at 12. 
 63. Timothy Mitchell, Society, Economy, and the State Effect, in STATE/CULTURE: STATE-
FORMATION AFTER THE CULTURAL TURN 76, 90 (George Steinmetz ed., 1999). Compare Mitchell, 
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draw from theorizations of the state an attunement to (1) the relations and 
processes involved in the ongoing making of corporations; (2) the role of 
geography and history in shaping corporations; and (3) the ways that ma-
terial practices inform abstract conceptions of corporations. 
Relational models of personhood developed by anthropologists 
working in South Asia and Melanesia can further open corporations to 
multidimensional analysis.64 Applied to corporations,65 a relational mod-
el that treats persons as partible (subject to external claims and extrac-
tions), composite (made up of heterogeneous parts), and permeable (as-
similating ideas and substances from the outside) allows us to explore 
how corporate identity and interests are distributed and highly contextual, 
produced through interactions and temporary associations among hu-
mans, animals, and objects in particular places.66 Always in the process 
of being enacted, corporations are able to incorporate parts that originat-
ed elsewhere without fully assimilating them.67 Where the liberal person 
model, which assumes an indivisible, consistent, self-present, and self-
knowing subject, is poorly equipped to handle complexity and contradic-
tion, these are ordinary features of relational models. 
David Graeber linked Strathern’s notion of the partible person to 
value in the following way: 
People have all sorts of potential identities, which most of the time 
exist only as a set of hidden possibilities. What happens in any giv-
en social situation is that another person fixes on one of these and 
thus “makes it visible.” One looks at a man, say, as a representative 
of his clan, or as one’s sister’s husband, or as the owner of a pig. 
Other possibilities, for the moment, remain invisible. It is at this 
point that a theory of value comes in: because Strathern uses the 
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phrases “making visible” and “giving value” more or less inter-
changeably.68 
Consider this statement in relation to the corporation. We can now 
see the shareholder value movement as one (rather than the sole) under-
standing of how the corporation is to be enacted, an understanding that 
fixes on the corporation’s relation to shareholders, and on the sharehold-
ers’ purported desire to maximize profits at the expense of people and 
planet. But we can still accommodate other kinds of understandings and 
enactments of corporations: as employers of workers; as producers of 
goods and services for consumers; as consumers of resources; as genera-
tors of pollution and waste; as debtors and creditors; as taxpayers in rela-
tion to municipal, regional, or state governments; as lobbyists with a 
stake in the rules according to which they will operate; and as subcon-
tractors, partners, and competitors in relation to other business enterpris-
es. Maximizing profits for shareholders is often invoked in debating how 
corporations ought to be enacted in these other relations, but it does not 
universally or consistently play the most foundational and determining 
role. The corporation is multiple.69  In various contexts and relations, 
people draw out and make visible a range of corporate qualities and po-
tentialities that are open to both valorization and critique. Our tendency 
to personify corporations (e.g., as expressed by the people on the street 
The Corporation) is influenced by the marketing, public relations, and 
advertising industries as well as more critical media.70 
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[N]ot just one Leviathan but many, interlocked one into another like chimera, 
each one claiming to represent the reality of all, the programme of the whole. 
Sometimes some of them manage to distort the others so horribly that, for a 
while, they seem the only soul in this artificial body. 
Id. 
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An anthropological perspective on personhood as multiple and rela-
tional has some compatibility with a legal perspective on the dynamic 
identities of humans and corporations. Orts, citing Joseph Vining, notes 
that just as humans shift among various identities over the course of a 
day, a year, or a lifetime (e.g., “sports player, parent, drug taker, dancer, 
corporate director, juror, investor, automobile salesman, artist”), and 
come to court in one of these roles (e.g., “tenant farmer, drug user, reli-
gious believer, or investor”), a firm may have legal standing “in different 
roles: as an employer, as a party to a contract with a supplier of goods, or 
as a bearer of certain constitutional rights.”71 
Since the corporate form was invented under Roman law, legal 
scholars have debated whether corporations (be they charities, religious 
organizations, universities, municipalities, or businesses) are best ap-
proached as aggregate collections of individual persons (e.g., members or 
shareholders), artificial creatures of the state, or real and natural entities, 
arguing as well over what entitlements and responsibilities flow from the 
theory adopted.72 Pointing to the indeterminacy of corporate personhood, 
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John Dewey argued that “‘person’ signifies what law makes it signify[,]” 
and could “be used simply as a synonym for a right-and-duty-bearing 
unit.”73 For Dewey, corporations should be understood in terms of their 
relations with others rather than their inner essence and nature; “will” 
and “interests” are emergent functions rather than intrinsic force or struc-
ture.74 
Next, I turn to a more empirical exploration of the entanglement of 
the state and corporation.75 One could approach this topic in several ways. 
In the context of extractive industries in Indonesia, one could study how 
corporations get involved in the work of welfare and governing and how 
government agents get involved as investors in the business of extraction. 
For the purposes of this Article, however, I will focus instead on exam-
ples of national forces committing violence in extractive industry zones. 
Analyzing the violent practices of the armed forces in these zones expos-
es the inadequacies of viewing the corporation as a self-determining sub-
ject modeled on the liberal person. 
III. THE CORPORATION, THE STATE, AND VIOLENCE 
In early October 2002, I was visiting the administrative offices of 
PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara’s Batu Hijau copper and gold mine,76 when 
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I ran into Pak Kapolsek, the police chief of Sekongkang, the subdistrict 
of the Indonesian island of Sumbawa where the mine is located. I had 
been conducting research on the mine’s Corporate Social Responsibility 
initiatives in local villages for almost a year.77 When I asked him what he 
was up to, Pak Kapolsek (Mr. District Police Chief) told me he was 
checking in with company officials to coordinate security plans for that 
night’s big event: Newmont had invited Aa Gymnastiar, a charismatic 
Muslim preacher and TV personality, to speak to mine workers and local 
residents.78 For many village residents, this represented a rare opportuni-
ty to see a national star in person. Knowing that there had recently been a 
heated dispute over which bus company would win a contract with 
Newmont, I asked the police chief whether buses would be available to 
pick up village residents. His demeanor changed. “Of course there [will] 
be buses to collect villagers,” he snapped, before adding, “You better not 
write about the dispute. You better only write good things about the re-
gion. I’ll take note if articles show up in the New York Times quoting you 
saying bad things.” He then inserted a finger into a spot on the hip of my 
jeans where they had begun to fray at the seam, and told me I ought to 
buy some new clothes. At the time, I was struck by the fact that Pak 
Kapolsek knew which international newspapers mattered. 79  When I 
wrote about our conversation in my field notes that evening, I did not 
immediately record Pak Kapolsek’s inappropriate gesture. It was clearly 
at odds with norms of contact between the sexes to which I was accus-
tomed in Indonesia, but, coming from a policeman, it was unsurprising, 
falling at the relatively innocuous and trivial end of a broader spectrum 
of acts of harassment that women commonly suffer in interactions with 
police. Only later did it occur to me that rather than simply abusing state 
power, Pak Kapolsek may have been asserting it. He was not simply tak-
ing a small liberty but making a threat. 
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Who stuck a finger in my jeans?80 Was it the state?81 The corpora-
tion? Perhaps the one acting on behalf of the other? While Weber assert-
ed that “there is no such thing as a collective personality which ‘acts,’”82 
he acknowledged the importance of the idea of various collective actors, 
which have 
a meaning in the minds of individual persons, partly as of some-
thing actually existing, partly as something with normative authori-
ty. . . . Actors thus in part orient their action to them, and in this role 
such ideas have a powerful, often a decisive, causal influence on the 
course of action of real individuals . . . .83 
Pak Kapolsek not only oriented himself towards the state and cor-
poration as actors with overlapping interests, he enacted them as inter-
twined entities that were potentially vulnerable to foreign journalists and 
researchers. He was, probably quite unconsciously, “doing” both the 
state and the corporation.84 
For Weber, bureaucracy achieved its “permanent character” and 
“practically unshatterable” power through its inculcation of habits, norms, 
and regulations into individuals.85 But, as Mitchell and others emphasize, 
the “effect” of the state as a metaphysical actor animated by particular 
goals and rationalities is also constituted through palpable, visible, solid, 
and discernible material practices and nonhuman elements.86 The same is 
true of the mining corporation, which acquires its place in people’s per-
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ceptions not simply from being a group of human individuals,87 but also 
from the material life of its logos as well as the offices, documents, infra-
structure, vehicles, ore, commodities, and waste produced by its mines.88 
The material lives of the mine and the police are intertwined in 
Sumbawa, constituted through ties of reciprocity and mutuality that were 
materialized in Newmont badges issued to police, Newmont’s subsidiz-
ing the construction of the police station that Pak Kapolsek ran, Pak 
Kapolsek’s involvement in security for events organized by the mine, the 
conduct of investigations into instances of civil violence targeting the 
mine, the failure of police to intervene when local residents attacked en-
vironmental activists who opposed the mine,89 and so forth. The Indone-
sian police force is poorly staffed and funded, yet police officers, like 
army officers, pay substantial bribes to obtain their positions as well as to 
secure promotions with the expectation that they will supplement their 
pay through bribes as well as legal and illegal business enterprise.90 Back 
in 2002, Batu Hijau housed a unit of the police’s Mobile Brigade divi-
sion, known as Brimob. Brimob is notorious for committing human 
rights violations.91 Batu Hijau’s most visible security force, however, 
was a private contractor called 911, a Jakarta-based security firm estab-
lished by former members of the Indonesian police. 
Newmont’s security strategy and relations with Brimob and 911 
developed in relation to a broader history of security strategies and rela-
tions in the extractive industries, which have been roundly criticized by 
human rights activists. Around the world, extractive industry companies 
rely on in-house security, private contractors, state police, military, or 
some combination thereof to protect their operations. The assiduous and 
often dangerous efforts of human rights organizations, as well as the in-
creasing pursuit of justice through lawsuits in the home countries of par-
ent corporations, have demonstrated that among various business sectors 
the extractive industries are disproportionately linked to human rights 
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abuses by security forces including rape, assault, torture, and extrajudi-
cial killings.92 While each case in which a security officer beats, rapes, 
tortures, or kills a civilian in the vicinity of a oil or mining operation 
might be regarded as a highly contingent event, by aggregating and dis-
seminating data about similar events, human rights groups have shown 
that “human rights abuses” are predictable consequences of extractive 
industry corporations operating in remote parts of the world. They enact 
corporations as “human rights abusers” by showing that corporations 
supply funds, transport, and equipment (including sites and objects used 
in the torture of individuals) to the security forces that, in a more proxi-
mate sense, carry out the abusing. As a consequence of these revelations, 
which work to “shame” corporations as moral actors,93 many companies 
now treat human rights abuses as part of their risk profile and corporate 
responsibility.94 Corporations may be held responsible for violence and 
militarization that arises directly from their presence, although they may 
only exercise partial control over this militarization. 
In Indonesia, the two most notorious cases of human rights abuses 
in an extractive industry context demonstrate some of the limits to view-
ing corporations as unitary actors with the capacity (if not always the 
will) to control the security forces that ostensibly protect them. These 
examples come from opposite ends of the archipelago: ExxonMobil’s oil 
fields in Aceh, and Freeport McMoRan’s copper and gold mine in West 
Papua. 95  In both cases, oil and mineral extraction fueled separatist 
movements due to the popular perception that while these regions suffer 
the brunt of environmental damage, the economic benefits of resource 
extraction are enjoyed in Jakarta and overseas.96 At the same time, the 
very presence of natural resource wealth holds out the promise that these 
regions could be economically viable as independent polities. Massive 
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military buildups around extractive operations, justified in terms of sepa-
ratist threats, have further exacerbated conflicts. 
The Freeport case merits closer scrutiny for its direct relevance to 
Newmont’s mines in Indonesia because Newmont hired a number of 
former Freeport executives to manage its Indonesian operations.97 Two 
New York Times journalists wrote a lengthy investigative article on Free-
port in 2005.98 In its opening paragraphs, the article depicts Freeport as 
maintaining “a nearly impenetrable redoubt” while “cloaked in the pro-
tection of the military,” and enjoying a “carefully cultivated cocoon of 
support” and “marriage of mutual convenience” with the Soeharto re-
gime.99 These phrases construct the corporation as an intentional and 
culpable actor that invited in the military to terrorize the local population 
and quash resistance. Yet this depiction seems quite strange in light of 
some of the evidence about the relationship between the military and the 
mine that emerges later in the article. 
A former social development officer claims that Freeport “really 
took it on the chin” with the military, which the company had initially 
kept at bay.100 In 1996, environmental and community protests against 
the mine turned into riots, and rioters ransacked Freeport offices and de-
stroyed some $3 million in mine equipment.101 Military personnel ap-
peared to be involved in directing the rioters.102 The various military ser-
vice units—police, army, navy, and air force—subsequently submitted 
“wish lists” to the mine.103 Freeport purchased $35 million worth of mili-
tary infrastructure, in addition to handing over millions of dollars in cash 
and in-kind payments annually to military commanders, all ostensibly 
earmarked for various legitimate expenses and programs.104 One Freeport 
security official likened the company’s compromise with the military to 
signing “a pact with the devil.”105 
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In 2002, a year in which, according to its SEC disclosures, Freeport 
paid $5.6 million to the military, vehicles on the Freeport road were at-
tacked by gunfire that left one Indonesian and two American school-
teachers dead and others injured.106 Although the military tried to pin 
blame for the attack on a disgruntled Papuan separatist, several Freeport 
officials with whom I met in 2003 readily admitted to me, off the record, 
that it was the work of military officials who were trying to shake down 
the company. One Freeport official speculated that the military was jeal-
ous of a fund the company had established for local community devel-
opment, while the New York Times journalists were told that military 
officials were concerned that Freeport might cut their flow of cash, 
which had come under activist, media, and shareholder scrutiny.107 Alt-
hough in human rights and mining industry circles it was common 
knowledge that the military was involved in the shootings, official Indo-
nesian and American investigations into the shootings did not yield the 
same conclusion. At a time when the United States was cultivating close 
ties with the Indonesian military, a potentially important ally in the Unit-
ed States’ global war on terror, evidence of their involvement in the 
deaths of U.S. citizens (never mind the Papuans, East Timorese, and 
Acehnese also killed over the years) was inconvenient.108 In addition to 
extracting funds directly from Freeport, military personnel also con-
trolled prostitution, crime, and drug rings in the vicinity of the mine. 
All of this calls into question the image of Freeport as a controlling 
agent deliberately cloaking itself in military protection. But the idea that 
the real Freeport is an innocent subject that stands apart from the Indone-
sian state and was forced into complicity with the military is also prob-
lematic. Rather, the corporation and the state enacted one another 
through these relations, through the “predatory reciprocities” that consti-
tute extractive industries in Indonesia.109 
With this discussion of Freeport in mind, let me return to New-
mont’s relations with Brimob in Indonesia. In October 2000, Newmont’s 
office in Mataram was bombed.110 No one was injured in the nighttime 
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bombing. Publicly, Newmont representatives trivialized the incident. 
One later told me it was “just a fish bomb,” and a spokesperson reported 
to the media that the bomb only “caused a half-meter-wide hole in the 
building.”111 Privately, Newmont managers took the incident seriously. 
One executive told me he was convinced that Brimob had carried out the 
bombing in order to discredit 911, Newmont’s security contractor. He 
said that police investigating the incident tried to pin the blame on a 911 
worker who had caught ten Brimob members trying to steal from New-
mont several weeks earlier. With the 911 worker in jail, Newmont repre-
sentatives accompanied and filmed the police as they undertook their 
investigation, and picked up and analyzed samples of every substance the 
police collected (e.g., coffee, milk powder, mouthwash, pieces of a pen) 
in order to have a separate but parallel record. The police eventually 
dropped the charges against the worker.112 The executive’s analysis of 
this incident illustrates parallels between Freeport’s and Newmont’s in-
teractions with national security forces. In both cases, those who are 
meant to protect instead threaten, putting the mining company’s offices, 
employees, and contractors at risk. But the scale of violence at Newmont 
pales in comparison to that at Freeport, in large part because Newmont 
managed to avoid giving the military any role in its security. 
During an interview in 2003, I asked a Newmont security executive 
in Denver how the company had set about cultivating relations with the 
Indonesian police and avoiding the military. 
Security Executive (SE): We picked the lesser of two evils.  We 
have Brimob on site but we manage them and that’s the key. 
Brimob is still evil. But we didn’t want TNI [Tentara Negara Indo-
nesia, the Indonesian army] making the moves on us, being subject-
ed to that kind of pressure. They are too corrupt, too powerful, and 
have too many guns. There is plenty of circumstantial evidence of 
their activities in crime and corruption . . . . 
MW: How do you manage Brimob in Sumbawa? 
SE: You throw out the assholes, and focus on the leaders.  We go to 
the commander in Jakarta and use our influence—through [PT 
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Newmont Minahasa Raya president] Rick Ness and others—to get 
rid of the bad ones. You carry out command and control. At first 
they were out poaching all the time in the forests with our trucks. 
The commander would go to Sumbawa Besar on the weekend. He’d 
be getting drunk and driving around and intimidating people in our 
vehicle using our name. We said, “We’re paying for this, you’re 
supposed to be on call.” We got obstinate. We got the good leaders 
in. You have to have a good NCO [noncommissioned officer].  The 
Brimob are all going to reflect the image of their commander. 
The security executive first describes Brimob as a foreign “evil.” 
He then notes that this evil gets attached to Newmont, and appears to 
assume its form with the rogue commander careening about “in our vehi-
cle using our name.” He then reasserts corporate control with the claim 
that Newmont is able to exercise “command and control,” to “throw out 
the assholes” and insists that Brimob be “on call” for the company. Over 
time, Newmont did manage to reduce the Brimob force on-site: in 2002, 
there were fewer than 100, and in 2004, this number shrank to 30. New-
mont went on to eliminate the on-site Brimob force entirely. Although 
Newmont removed Brimob from its regular security arrangements, the 
company still had internal security management, the private subcontrac-
tor 911, the regular police force outside the gates led by the resident Pak 
Kapolsek, and informal relations with village residents who mobilized 
their own understandings of corporate security needs.113 
Newmont executives were proud of keeping the military at a dis-
tance, and of their success in keeping Brimob under relative control and 
then of ridding the Batu Hijau mine of the Brimob presence entirely. In 
these arenas they take credit. If Brimob had carried out human rights 
abuses, they might privately distance themselves from blame, although 
human rights activists, journalists, and lawyers would frame the compa-
ny as responsible for abuses catalyzed by the mine’s presence. Similarly, 
I heard American executives claim that Newmont had managed to dodge 
business partnerships with members of the Soeharto family who, in early 
stages of mine planning, tried to force Newmont’s hand by withholding 
permits. The same executives admitted, however, that this required the 
company to endure long delays and even threaten to walk from the pro-
ject—strategies that were only effective because the mine did not prom-
ise to be especially lucrative.114 By the same token, this mine attracted 
less interest from the military than a richer mine like Freeport’s in West 
Papua. Newmont’s power to hold unwanted actors and relations at a dis-
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tance rested on a relative lack of power in the form of a low-grade 
orebody.115 
Ira Bashkow remarks that “if anything in the world should be re-
fractory to individualistic theorization, it is such a collectively produced, 
highly structured, relational entity as the corporation.”116 The model of 
the individual actor capable of self-interest and unconstrained choice, 
however, is so compelling that it routinely serves as “the first port of call 
for economists, lawyers, business ethicists, and others—proponents and 
critics of corporate personhood alike.”117 My discussion of Newmont and 
Freeport’s security strategies and quandaries in Indonesia should illus-
trate that companies do not simply choose to collaborate with armed 
forces and commit human rights abuses so as to increase shareholder 
profits, as standard critical narratives might have it. Corporations are, 
rather, embedded institutions, located in national and regional geographic 
and historical conjunctures that they can shape, but rarely control. 
CONCLUSION 
In The Corporation, Bakan makes the case that corporations un-
leash great social and environmental harm because they are legally 
obliged to maximize profits for shareholders.118 This appealingly simple 
account unfortunately fails to interrogate its own legal foundation, and 
says nothing about why corporations that are not publicly traded are also 
socially and environmentally destructive. An alternative role for the cor-
porate critic would be to question and demote rather than to amplify and 
reinforce the “textbook economics view” 119 of the corporation, to allow 
that corporate executives have the legitimate capacity (without naïvely 
assuming the natural propensity) to make more ethical choices when they 
stand at a crossroads rather than naturalizing the worst corporate behav-
ior. 
In presenting us with a ready-made culprit, Bakan’s account also 
has the unfortunate effect of obscuring the wider swathe of actors who 
share responsibility for capitalist harms. Ian Lee argues that by concep-
tualizing the corporation as monstrous, Bakan masks the more insidious 
“banality of evil” that Lee locates in the aggregate decisions of ordinary 
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shareholders who buy shares of harmful corporations. Analysis need not 
halt, however, at the shareholder; we could gaze further to how workers 
in the United States often become indirect shareholders through the im-
position of 401(k) and 403(b) account programs to support their retire-
ment. Similarly, in the case of disasters such as BP’s Deepwater Horizon 
explosion and spill, we can lay blame not only on the monstrous BP, but 
also on the U.S. government for allowing BP to engage in risky drilling 
practices despite its poor safety and environmental record, on the media 
that stoked gas price hysteria, on consumers for their reliance on auto-
mobiles, and on planners for creating environments hostile to public 
transportation. The identities of the actors responsible for harm are not 
simply given in the world in clearly bounded form, but must be enacted 
at every turn in a capitalist system that is structured such that ordinary 
consumers, shareholders, and workers may be simultaneously perpetra-
tors and victims of environmental and social violence. 
The law allows for more complex distributions of responsibility 
among multiple actors (individual business participants and business en-
terprises) in the wake of disasters (e.g., BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill), 
while at the same time placing limits on which actors can plausibly be 
subject to which laws, and what punishment can follow for corporations 
classically seen as having no soul to damn or body to kick.120 In her criti-
cal study of tort law, Jain argues that by narrowing and isolating the 
identities of the injured and injuring party, and assigning the latter blame 
for injury, we lose sight of the ideas, materials, relations, and practices 
that structure injury as a normal (rather than exceptional) feature of capi-
talism.121 At the same time, the law is not fixed. Although the law may 
be designed to support rather than undermine the capitalist system, pro-
gressive business and legal theorists have pointed out that judges differ 
over and often work to preserve indeterminacy with respect to the theory 
of the firm, and that legal fictions are malleable and may be subject to 
reform if they are not serving society’s interests.122 
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Drawing on Hans Vaihinger’s notion of “as if,” Riles notes that 
corporate personhood is one example of a legal fiction: knowledge that is 
consciously false and therefore irrefutable.123 For Vaihinger, the “as if” 
was “at its core always and only a means to an end,” a subjunctive truth 
to which Riles ascribes an instrumental nature, a purposeful quality or 
directionality.124 For anthropologist Marilyn Strathern, relational models 
of personhood are also fictions, useful for thinking with and for reflect-
ing on the fiction of the liberal subject rather than faithful representations 
of how Melanesians construe their fellow beings. The question for the 
anthropological study of corporations then is how our models (relational 
personhood, Homo economicus, or beyond) serve our analysis. 
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